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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

SAFARIS UNLIMITED, LLC, a Georgia
limited liability company,

Supreme Court Docket No. 44914-2017
Twin Falls County Case No. CV-2013-2706

Plaintiff/Respondent/Cross-appellant,

v.
MIKE VON JONES,
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-respondent.

RESPONDENT I CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofldaho,
in and for the County of Twin Falls
Honorable Randy J. Stoker, District Judge, Presiding

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT/
CROSS-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT/
CROSS-APPELLANT

Theodore R. Larsen (ISB #8193)
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338

David W. Gadd (ISB #7605)
WORST, FITZGERALD & STOVER, PLLC
P.O. Box 1428
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1428
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I.

ARGUMENT

Jones's Reply Brief focuses on the issues presented by Safaris Unlimited's cross-appeal.
Specifically, Jones argues that 1) given the evidence in the record, the trial court did not need to
find the "specific value" of the Sligar Lawsuit in order to find that the consideration obtained by
the sheriffs sale was grossly inadequate; 2) the fact that the Sligar Lawsuit is an unliquidated
claim of Jones's and the possibility that its sale could cause him harm are sufficient "additional
circumstances" to support the trial court's Order setting aside the sheriff's sale; 3) Idaho Code§
11-304 provides an additional basis upon which to affirm the trial court's Order; and 4) the trial
court's Order to set the sheriff's sale aside is supported by the "sound public policy" that
judgment creditors should not be allowed to execute on unliquidated claims.
Many of these arguments have been addressed, in part, in Safaris Unlimited's revised
brief, submitted previously to this Court. In this brief, Safaris Unlimited will further demonstrate
why Jones's arguments are without merit.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND THAT THE SLIGAR LAWSUIT HAD ANY
VALUE.
Jones contends that the trial court was not required to find the "specific value of the

Sligar Lawsuit," which implies that Safaris Unlimited has argued to the contrary. This is
incorrect. Safaris Unlimited has never argued that the trial court must make a finding of the
Sligar Lawsuit's "specific value." But, at a minimum, the trial court must be able to finds that the
asset has at least some value to it. Yet, in this case the trial court was unable to make that finding,
stating, "It may be that Mr. Sliger owes Mr. Jones some money, it may be that Mr. Jones owes
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Mr. Sliger some money, it may be that neither one of them owes anybody money. Who knows?"
Tr Vol. II, p. 38, L. 25-p. 39, L. 3.
The trial court's inability to determine whether the Sligar Lawsuit has any value may be
due to several factors. For example, although Jones testified that he contributed in excess of
$700,000 to the business and that he estimates that the joint assets are worth approximately
$2,000,000, he further testified that his estimate does not take into account the return on his
investments throughout the business relationship. R Vol. II, pp. 84-85. The record does not state
the amounts that Jones received throughout the relationship as returns on his investments, but it
is reasonable to conclude that Jones's share of the joint assets may be significantly less than
$2,000,000, even if one only assumes a 50/50 relationship between Jones and Sligar/ Overtime
Garage, LLC. See id. Moreover, Sligar and Overtime Garage, LLC have asserted a number of
counterclaims against Jones, which may completely offset or even exceed the amount to which
Jones is ultimately found to be entitled. Id. at pp. 53-63. The expense associated with litigating
Jones's claims in the Sligar Lawsuit also reduces the value of that asset.
The record and the transcript of the hearing do not reveal the extent of the trial court's
consideration of these factors. However, as noted above, the trial court did expressly state that it
was possible that Jones may be owed nothing on his claims and may even owe Sligar money. Tr
Vol. II, p. 38, L. 25-p. 39, L. 3. Given the trial court's inability to find that the Sligar Lawsuit
had any value, it could not reasonably conclude that Safaris Unlimited's bid was grossly
inadequate. Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion and erred in setting aside the
sheriffs sale.
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B.

THE "ADDITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE" REQUIRED TO SET A SHERIFF'S SALE
ASIDE MUST RELATE TO THE SALE, NOT THE NATURE OF THE PROPERTY
BEING SOLD.
As Jones notes in his Brief, this Court recently stated, "Our decisions have uniformly

held that there must be some irregularity in the sale or other slight additional circumstance [to set
aside a sheriffs sale]." Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 154 Idaho 724,730,302 P.3d 349, 355 (2013).
The issue before the Court in this case is what constitutes "other slight additional circumstance."
As discussed in Safaris Unlimited's revised brief, nearly all of the cases reviewed and
analyzed by the Phillips Court involve an irregularity with the conduct of the sheriffs sale. The
only case discussed in which there was not an irregularity with the conduct of the sale itself is

Tudor Engineering Co. v. Mouw, 109 Idaho 573, 709 P.2d 146 (1985), in which the additional
circumstance was "the judgment [creditor's failure] to provide any of the interested parties with
actual notice of the execution sale." Phillips, 154 Idaho at 729,302 P.3d at 354. Thus, all of the
cases cited by Phillips in which this Court held that the sale should have been set aside involved
circumstances related to the sale. Accordingly, when this Court stated in Phillips that there must
be an "irregularity in the sale or other slight additional circumstance," it was referring to
circumstances surrounding the sale.
Jones nevertheless argues that any additional circumstance is sufficient, provided it
results in some harm to the judgment debtor. In support of this argument, Jones references this
Court's observation in Phillips that in each of the cases to date in which the sheriffs sale was
properly set aside or should have been set aside, "the party injured by the grossly inadequate sale
price and additional circumstance was the judgment debtor." Id. That statement, however, was
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not a basis of this Court's holding in Phillips or otherwise treated as anything other than a mere
observation.
Rather, Phillips was decided on the grounds that a party's mistaken understanding of the
law or failure to take adequate measures to protect her interests does not constitute an "additional
circumstance." Id. at 730, 302 P.3d at 355. This Court did not limit that holding to cases where
the judgment creditor was the party that made the mistake of law or failed to protect her interests,
and there is no reason to believe that the result would have been any different if the mistaken
party in that case had instead been the judgment debtor.
As Phillips demonstrates, not all things deemed "additional circumstances" by a party are
sufficient grounds to set aside a sheriffs sale. This is true even if those additional circumstances
may cause harm to the judgment debtor. For example, a judgment debtor's mistaken belief that
he was prohibited from attending the sheriffs sale or promoting the sale in order to potentially
increase the price at which his property is sold would not be grounds to set the sale aside. The
fact that the judgment debtor may be injured as a result of his mistaken understanding is
immaterial.
Jones's argument that the Sligar Lawsuit involves an unliquidated claim and, therefore,
its sale creates the potential likelihood of harm to Jones is unpersuasive. The only potential harm
that Jones may incur is that he will not receive the full value of the asset due to an inadequate
purchase price. Thus, the argument that potential financial harm to Jones is an "additional
circumstance" is simply another way of asserting that the winning bid was too low. "This Court
has not previously held that gross inadequacy of price, standing alone, provides grounds for
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setting aside a sheriffs sale. Our decisions have uniformly held that there must be some
irregularity in the sale or other slight additional circumstance." Id. Therefore, the financial harm
that Jones asserts he may incur does not provide an "additional circumstance" necessary to grant
relief from the sheriffs sale.
C.

IDAHO CODE § 11-304 HAS NO BEARING ON THIS CASE.
Jones makes passing reference to Idaho Code§ 11-304 in support of his contention that

the unliquidated nature of the Sligar Lawsuit provides the additional circumstance required to set
the sale aside. Jones appears to base his argument in this regard on the second sentence of that
section, which states, "After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution, no more
can be sold." Idaho Code§ 11-304. This sentence applies to situations where a sheriff has levied
upon multiple items of property, rather than a single item. If the sale of some of those items
results in proceeds sufficient to satisfy the judgment, then the sheriff is required to discontinue
the sale of the remaining items. Where there is only a single item of property to be sold,
however, the requirement is inapplicable. Therefore, Jones's reliance on section 11-304 is
entirely misplaced.
D.

JONES'S PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE
LEGISLATURE, AS THEY ADDRESS WHETHER THE SLIGAR LAWSUIT
SHOULD BE EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION, NOT WHETHER THE SHERIFF'S
SALE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.
Jones spends significant time in his brief setting forth what he describes as "sound public

policy" that supports the trial court's decision "to deny the sale of unliquidated litigation via
public auction." Appellant's Reply Br., p. 6. The use of the term "deny the sale" is revealing, as

RESPONDENT I CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF I Page 5

it shows that Jones's argument, at its core, is not that there were additional circumstances that
justified setting aside the sale but rather that the asset should not have been sold at all. Stated
differently, Jones's argument is that unliquidated claims should be exempt from execution.
Jones's contention in that regard is better directed toward the Idaho Legislature, as it falls
under the Legislature's purview to determine what property is exempt from execution. The Idaho
Legislature has determined that all nonexempt property of a judgment debtor is liable to
execution. Idaho Code§ 11-201. Furthermore, "It is well recognized that a debtor's right to
exempt property from the claims of creditors is not a common law right but is dependent upon
constitutional or statutory allowance. Thus, the general rule is that assets are not exempt from the
claims of creditors unless specifically exempted by statute." Hooper v. State, 127 Idaho 945,
950, 908 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Ct. App. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
There is no exemption available to Jones relative to the Sligar Lawsuit under Idaho Code,
and Jones has not asserted any such exemption exists. Rather, Jones is asking this Court to create
an exemption not provided for by statute, which, with due respect to this Court, would require it
to exercise powers that it does not have. As this Court has noted,
While the statute should be liberally construed, it has been held that construction
should not be indulged in to the extent of conferring privileges and benefits by
construction which were not intended to be conferred by the Legislature, or to the
extent of doing violence to the terms of the statute.

Youngv. Wright, 77 Idaho 244,246,290 P.2d 1086, 1087 (1955) (quoting Conlin v. Traeger,
258 P. 433,434 (Cal. 1927).
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Safaris Unlimited rejects Jones's contention that "sound public policy" requires the
recognition of an exemption for unliquidated claims. In any event, however, the validity of those
arguments is a decision for the Idaho Legislature to make, not this Court. At this time, the Idaho
Legislature has not created an exemption or any other special status for a judgment debtor's
unliquidated claims. Thus, under Idaho law, the Sligar Lawsuit is not exempt, and the sheriffs
sale should be allowed to stand.
IL

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth, above, and in its prior brief, Safaris Unlimited respectfully
requests that this Court reverse and vacate the trial court's Order Granting Motion to Set Aside

Sheriff's Sale. Additionally, Safaris Unlimited requests that this Court affirm the Judgment
entered by the trial court and award Safaris Unlimited its attorney's fees incurred in connection
with this appeal.
DATED this 3rd day of January, 2018.
WORST, FITZGERALD & STOVER, PLLC

By:

~ (lc;t?[")
David W. Gadd
Attorneys for Safaris Unlimited, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of January, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT I CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be served
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Theodore R. Larsen
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH,

LLP P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/
Cross-respondent

C8J

D
D

C8J

U.S. Mail
Overnight Mail
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135
Electronic Mail: trlarsen@wmlattys.com

David W. Gadd
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